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THE STATE GIVETH AND TAKETH AWAY: RACE, CLASS, 
AND URBAN HOSPITAL CLOSINGS
SHAUN OSSEI-OWUSU*
“The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away.” Job 1:21
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this symposium is to investigate, expand, and challenge 
two core ideas in Bernadette Atuahene’s remarkable book We Want What’s 
Ours: Learning from South Africa’s Land Restitution Program.1 The con-
cepts—dignity takings and dignity restoration—expand the boundaries of 
socio-legal inquiry as it relates to property loss and attendant remedies. 
Individuals across the scholarly and thematic spectrum have picked up the 
baton from Professor Atuahene and are applying these ideas in areas as 
diverse as slavery, education, punishment, and tax foreclosure.2
My modest contribution to this mélange of topics focuses on a part of 
the American economy that consumes 17.8 percent of our nation’s Gross 
Domestic Product: health care and health administration.3 I am specifically 
interested in the trend of urban hospital closings in low-income neighbor-
hoods.4 This essay examines how Atuahene’s framework illuminates new 
* Academic Fellow and Kellis E. Parker Teaching Fellow, Columbia Law School.
1. BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S
LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM (2014). 
2. See, e.g., Symposium, Dignity Takings | Dignity Restoration, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forth-
coming 2017).
3. NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-
Sheet.html [https://perma.cc/QU67-XTJV].
4. A few things are worth noting at the outset. First, by urban hospital I am referring specifically 
to safety-net hospitals in large cities, although much of what I describe is applicable to non-profit 
hospitals in large cities as well. Second, public hospital closings are not a new development but some-
thing that has been unfolding for decades. See, e.g., Alan Sager, Why Urban Voluntary Hospitals Close,
18 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 451 (1983); Mitchell F. Rice, Inner-City Hospital Closures/Relocations: Race, 
Income Status, and Legal Issues, 24 SOC. SCI. & MED. 889 (1987); OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-0495-0050, TRENDS IN URBAN HOSPITAL CLOSURE 1987–1993
(1995); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Health Care for the Poor and Uninsured After a Public Hospital’s
Closure or Conversion, in ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM (The Urban Inst., Occasional Paper No. 
39, 2000); OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI 04-02-00611, TRENDS 
IN URBAN HOSPITAL CLOSURE 1990–2000 (2003); Brietta R. Clark, Hospital Flight from Minority 
Communities: How Our Existing Civil Rights Framework Fosters Racial Inequality in Healthcare, 9 
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1023 (2005); Michelle Ko et al., Residential Segregation and the Survival 
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and productive ways of thinking about the trend of urban hospital closings; 
at the same time, I show how her model is not the snuggest fit for thinking 
about the shuttering of these institutions. By doing the latter, I demonstrate 
how hospital closings help enrich and supplement her concepts by explor-
ing the trajectory of Martin Luther King, Jr. Community Hospital, an insti-
tution that serves South Los Angeles, California.
The hospital and its educational affiliate Charles R. Drew University 
of Medicine and Science—colloquially known together as King/Drew 
Medical Center (“KDMC”)5—opened in the early 1970s.6 Local and state 
government believed that the institution would meet the health care needs 
of this majority black section of Los Angeles, as well as provide jobs for 
pink, blue, and white-collar workers.7 KDMC ebbed and flowed with the 
nation’s rapidly changing health care landscape in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century—a time where poverty and legislation put new pressures 
and responsibilities on public hospitals. But during this period, the prob-
lems of crack cocaine, gun violence, and sexually-transmitted diseases 
impacted the health of public hospitals in big cities across the country.8 At
the turn of the century, when the government and the public were increas-
ingly looking askance at certain parts of the welfare state and public financ-
ing of health care, safety-net hospitals received more scrutiny.9 In 2004, the 
Los Angeles Times produced an award-winning series of reports on 
KDMC’s shortcomings; a high profile instance of medical malpractice, 
which led to a woman’s death and was captured on camera, caused the 
of U.S. Urban Public Hospitals, 71 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 243, 243–60 (2014). Finally, rural hospi-
tals are also closing at alarming rate, although that is not the focus of this paper. For a recent take on 
this problem, see generally Ayla Ellison, The Rural Hospital Closure Crisis: 15 Key Findings and 
Trends, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/the-
rural-hospital-closure-crisis-15-key-findings-and-trends.html [https://perma.cc/9J49-8NNA].
5. The hospital went through numerous name changes because of different affiliations and 
reorganizations. Some included Martin Luther King Jr. General Hospital, Martin Luther King Jr./Drew 
Medical Center (King/Drew), Martin Luther King Jr. Multi-Service Ambulatory Care Center, Martin 
Luther King Jr. Outpatient Center, Martin Luther King Jr.–Harbor Hospital. This essay generally refers 
to the institution as King/Drew (KDMC) and delineates between the hospital and school when neces-
sary. 
6. Charles R. Drew Postgraduate Medical School was incorporated in 1966 and opened its 
offices in 1970. Martin Luther King Jr. General Hospital opened in 1972. See Drew Medical School 
Opens Offices in Watts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1970, at 17; King Hospital to Open Doors Today, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1972, at 31. 
7. ROBERT BAUMAN, RACE AND THE WAR ON POVERTY: FROM WATTS TO EAST L.A. 76 (2008). 
8. CLARENCE LUSANE, PIPE DREAM BLUES: RACISM AND THE WAR ON DRUGS 63–64 (1991); 
Edward E. Cornwell, III, Violence, Guns, and Race: Health-care Professionals Must Speak Out, 86 J.
NAT’L MED. ASS’N 333 (1994); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL PLAN 
TO ELIMINATE SYPHILIS FROM THE UNITED STATES 54 (2006). 
9. See generally INST. OF MED., AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET: INTACT BUT 
ENDANGERED (Marion Ein Lewin & Stuart Altman eds., 2000).
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federal government to monitor the hospital and subsequently close it in 
2007.10 In 2015, the hospital opened as a smaller outfit in the post-
Affordable Care Act environment.11
KDMC’s opening as an institution designed to meet the needs of a 
specific demographic group, its closing, and reopening provide the perfect 
context to explore and reimagine the concepts of dignity takings and digni-
ty restoration. Part II focuses on the 1940s through the 1960s and discusses 
the circumstances that led to the creation of KDMC.12 It weaves this con-
text with early legislative and judicial developments that arguably helped 
South Los Angeles residents develop a property interest in KDMC. Part 
III’s examination of the 1970s to the turn of the twenty-first century con-
tinues the discussion on legislative developments and ties them to KDMC’s 
existence during this period. This part connects the institution’s 2007 shut-
tering to Atuahene’s understanding of takings and dignity takings. Part IV 
puts Professor Atuahene’s concept of dignity restoration in conversation 
with the hospital’s reopening in 2015.
II. THE CREATION OF KDMC AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROPERTY
INTERESTS
A. A Safety-Net Hospital is Born
During the first half of the twentieth century, boosters marketed 
Southern California as a utopia.13 This was hardly true for the small group 
of African Americans that migrated to Los Angeles in the early 1900s14 and
for the droves of people that followed in the middle of that century.15 In
10. See The Troubles at King/Drew, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2015, 10:45 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-kingdrewpulitzer-sg-storygallery.html [http://perma.cc/V8YW-
K9N9] (collecting all of the 2004 KDMC investigative articles).
11. Soumya Karlamangla, South L.A.’s MLK Hospital Will Reopen with a New Healthcare Out-
look, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2015, 2:00 PM), www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-adv-mlk-hospital-
20150329-story.html [http://perma.cc/X35L-Z98S].
12. For the most substantive treatment of the hospital, to which my own work is indebted, see 
Darnell Hunt & Ana-Christina Ramón, Killing “Killer King”: The Los Angeles Times and a “Trou-
bled” Hospital in the ‘Hood, in BLACK LOS ANGELES: AMERICAN DREAMS AND RACIAL REALITIES
283–320 (Darnell Hunt & Ana-Christina Ramón eds., 2010).
13. See generally KEVIN STARR, MATERIAL DREAMS: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THROUGH THE 
1920S (1990); BECKY M. NICOLAIDES, MY BLUE HEAVEN: LIFE AND POLITICS IN THE WORKING-CLASS 
SUBURBS OF LOS ANGELES, 1920–1965 (2002); TOM ZIMMERMAN, PARADISE PROMOTED: THE
BOOSTER CAMPAIGN THAT CREATED LOS ANGELES, 1870–1930 (2008); A COMPANION TO LOS 
ANGELES (William Deverell & Greg Hise eds., 2010).
14. See generally DOUGLAS FLAMMING, BOUND FOR FREEDOM: BLACK LOS ANGELES IN JIM 
CROW AMERICA (2005); MARNE L. CAMPBELL, MAKING BLACK LOS ANGELES: CLASS, GENDER, AND 
COMMUNITY, 1850–1917 (2016). 
15. See generally JOSH SIDES, L.A. CITY LIMITS: AFRICAN AMERICAN LOS ANGELES FROM THE 
GREAT DEPRESSION TO THE PRESENT (2006). 
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Los Angeles, blacks were not subject to the exact kind of vigilante violence 
that was prevalent in the South or the squalor of eastern and midwestern 
ghettos; but economic and physical safety were not givens.16 Moreover,
African-American Los Angelinos were subject to garden-variety segrega-
tion.17 As the African-American population increased in the 1940s, blacks 
became increasingly quarantined into the southeast section of Los Angeles, 
particularly Watts. In Fairchild v. Raines, a case involving covenants in 
Pasadena (a city in Los Angeles County), famed jurist Roger Traynor wrote 
that, “it must be recognized that the steady migration of southern negroes 
and the influx of negroes into urban communities in response to the in-
creasing demands of industry for labor, together with race segregation, 
have made it impossible for many negroes to find decent housing in large 
centers of population.”18
Inadequate health care was another problem for the black community 
in Watts. The federal government passed the Hospital Survey and Con-
struction Act (also known as the “Hill–Burton Act”) in 1946 as a post-War 
attempt to assist states in the improvement of existing hospitals and the 
creation of new ones.19 A year after the law was passed, Dr. Vane M. Hoge, 
Chief of the Division of Hospital Facilities in the Public Health Service, 
stated that, “the act reflects the current concept that public health includes 
responsibility for the treatment and care of the individual. It recognizes, 
also, that hospitals are an integral part of our social fabric, on a par in the 
community with the church and the school.”20 Considering the precarious 
health environment that racial minorities across the country faced,21 black
residents in Los Angeles were well suited to benefit from this piece of leg-
islation. But a few features blunted the law’s efficacy: weak enforcement 
mechanisms and regulatory oversight by the federal government;22 a prohi-
16. See generally KEITH E. COLLINS, BLACK LOS ANGELES: THE MATURING OF THE GHETTO,
1940–1950 (1980); KELLY LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, CITY OF INMATES: CONQUEST, REBELLION, AND THE 
RISE OF HUMAN CAGING IN LOS ANGELES, 1771–1965 (2017).
17. RICHARD R. W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY 
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 104 (2013) (“By the early 1920s, racial cove-
nants had become sufficiently common that the developers of Los Angeles’ Palos Verdes Estates would 
refer to them as ‘the usual restrictions.’”). 
18. Fairchild v. Raines, 151 P.2d 260, 268 (Cal. 1944) (citations omitted).
19. Ch. 958, 60 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291–291o (2016)).
20. V. M. Hoge, The Hospital Survey and Construction Act, 62 PUB. HEALTH REP. 49, 54 (1947).
21. See generally NAYAN SHAH, CONTAGIOUS DIVIDES: EPIDEMICS AND RACE IN SAN
FRANCISCO’S CHINATOWN (2001); NATALIA MOLINA, FIT TO BE CITIZENS?: PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
RACE IN LOS ANGELES, 1879–1939 (2006); SAMUEL KELTON ROBERTS, JR., INFECTIOUS FEAR:
POLITICS, DISEASE, AND THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF SEGREGATION (2009).
22. William Worthington & Laurens H. Silver, Regulation of Quality of Care in Hospitals: The 
Need for Change, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 309 (1970); Marilyn G. Rose, Federal Regulation 
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bition on discrimination with a carved-out acceptance for separate-but-
equal facilities;23 and a requirement that proposed hospitals demonstrate 
their economic viability. 24 These weaknesses filtered into Los Angeles’s
health environment.
Dr. Lester Breslow, who served as former director of the California 
Department of Public Health, helpfully described the medical environment 
for African Americans in Los Angeles in the middle of the twentieth centu-
ry. Reflecting on the 1960s, he provided a high-level snapshot of public 
health for black people in Los Angeles:
So we had a map of the state, all divided up, and each one was a hospital 
region. I said, ‘I’d like to take a look at the hospital region of Watts be-
cause I hear terrible things about that.’ So the map is brought in and we 
look at it and here is an oblong area in the middle of Los Ange-
les . . . that had no hospitals . . . . There were some hospitals on the pe-
riphery, on the very edges. Very small, very poor hospitals. So small that 
they could be nothing other than poor. Mostly small, proprietary hospi-
tals. Most people who got sick in Watts had to be what they called $10 
sick (that meant they would have to take a taxi cab for $10 to get to the 
big county hospital, because to go on the bus would require three trans-
fers. That was completely unfeasible for anybody who was seriously 
sick) so they had to be $10 sick to get to the county hospital. I said, ‘My 
goodness, how can that be?’ Well, it was very simple. The area was all 
regionalized. The only trouble was that the right upper quarter of Watts 
was drawn into an adjacent hospital area where there were better living 
conditions over there, and the left upper quarter was drawn off similarly. 
The whole of Watts was just quartered into other areas where there were 
hospitals, but not to serve the people in Watts.25
The absence of a hospital that could meet the needs of Los Angeles’s
black community was not due to a lack of effort. In 1950, black doctors and 
of Services to the Poor Under the Hill–Burton Act: Realities and Pitfalls, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 168 
(1975).
23. Section 622(f) of the Hospital Survey and Reconstruction Act stated:
[S]uch hospital or addition to a hospital will be made available to all persons residing in the 
territorial area of the applicant, without discrimination on account of race, creed, or color, but 
an exception shall be made in cases where separate hospital facilities are provided for sepa-
rate population groups, if the plan makes equitable provision on the basis of need for facilities 
and services of like quality for each such group. 
KAREN KRUSE THOMAS, DELUXE JIM CROW: CIVIL RIGHTS AND AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY, 1935–
1954, at 116 (2011) (discussing the consequences of “separate but equal” segregation, and its effect on 
African-American health care in the early twentieth century).
24. PAUL V. DUTTON, DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSES: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 185 (2007).
25. Lester Breslow, Vision and Reality in State Health Care: Medi-Cal and Other Public Pro-
grams, 1946–1975; an Interview Conducted by Gabrielle Morris in 1984, at 71 (1985) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of Cali-
fornia).
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citizens tried to raise money from private sources that could be matched by 
state and federal government for the construction of a hospital, but they
were rebuffed.26 Local and state government rejected continued efforts by 
celebrities such as boxer Joe Louis as well as prominent black physicians.27
The 1965 Watts riots changed everything and spurred government into 
action.
The uprising in Watts is notable for a few reasons. First, the scope and 
scale of the riot was exceptional.28 The United States is no stranger to race 
riots, but historically such disturbances typically involved whites terroriz-
ing blacks.29 A few cities erupted in violence the previous summer, but 
Watts was unique for its unprecedented television coverage.30 African
Americans’ destruction of property—a strategy that amplified their frustra-
tions with racial inequality—was lodged into American living rooms.31
Second and relatedly, the Watts riot is notable because it occurred a mere 
week after the Voting Rights Act took effect and one month after Medicaid 
and Medicare were signed into law by President Johnson.32 The uprising 
challenged the narrative of racial progress and inaugurated the black power 
ethos that shifted racial fault lines in the United States. In hindsight, the riot 
occurred at an opportune time: precisely when there was still a meaningful 
commitment to poverty-reduction but before racial fatigue and backlash 
thwarted the potential for the welfare state’s blossoming.
Allegations of police brutality spurred the riots, but a state commis-
sion, headed by former CIA director John A. McCone, released a report 
that highlighted poverty, unemployment, poor education, and poor health 
care as the core issues that undergirded black Los Angelinos’ frustration.33
After outlining a variety of health disparities in southeast Los Angeles vis-
à-vis the rest of the County,34 the Commission stated that it “believes that 
26. M. Moss Humphrey, Martin Luther King, Jr., General Hospital and Community Involvement,
61 BULL. MED. LIBR. ASS’N 324 (1973).
27. Id.
28. GERALD HORNE, FIRE THIS TIME: THE WATTS UPRISING AND THE 1960S, at 3 (1997).
29. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RACE RIOTS (Walter C. Rucker, Jr. & James N. 
Upton eds., 2006). 
30. Michael W. Flamm, Opinion, The Original Long, Hot Summer: The Legacy of the 1964 
Harlem Riot, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/opinion/16Flamm.html 
[http://perma.cc/T9CD-JSSF].
31. JILL EDY, TROUBLED PASTS: NEWS AND THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF SOCIAL UNREST 22–
58 (2006). 
32. Id.
33. GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON THE L. A. RIOTS, VIOLENCE IN THE CITY—AN END OR 
BEGINNING? (1965).
34. For example, the report noted that, “the number of doctors in the southeastern part of Los 
Angeles is grossly inadequate as compared with other parts of the city. It is reported that there are 106 
physicians for some 252,000 people, whereas the county ratio is three times higher.” Id. at 74.
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immediate and favorable consideration should be given to a new, compre-
hensively-equipped hospital in this area.”35 Eventually, various levels of 
government, activists, and scholars at University of Southern California 
and University of California Los Angeles worked together to open Charles 
R. Drew University of Medicine and Science and Martin Luther King, Jr., 
General Hospital in 1970, and 1972, respectively.36
B. Safety-Net Hospitals as Property?
Understanding the unique “property rights” involved with the creation 
of a hospital is important to an analysis that considers the “taking” of a 
public institution such as KDMC. A safety-net hospital sits somewhere 
between state property and communal property. Alison Clarke and Paul 
Kohler note that there is no consensus around the “dividing line” between 
the two.37 For them, “if the user has the right not to be excluded from use 
by the state (i.e. the state cannot prohibit the use by that individual without 
changing the law)” then it could be considered open access communal 
property rather than as state property, but “if the state provides the facility 
and merely licenses users to use it by permission revocable by administra-
tive action, then we can call this state property.”38 Both apply to public 
hospitals; they are owned by the government, and individuals, particularly 
the indigent, have a right to use the hospital. At the same time, administra-
tive action—e.g., guidelines for what constitutes the indigence—could 
delimit effectuation of those rights.
Different statutory, judicial, and administrative developments illus-
trate how Watts residents developed a version of property interests in what 
would become KDMC. Demographically, the hospital’s creation was prem-
ised on unmet health care needs of specific communities: poor blacks and 
Latinos. A health service area is a geographical unit of analysis that in-
cludes one or more counties that are self-contained with respect to the pro-
vision of routine hospital care.39 KDMC’s health service area included a 
thirty-three-square-mile section of South Los Angeles that was predomi-
nantly low-income, had high unemployment, and, according to 1970 census 
data, was populated by approximately 340,000 people, eighty-two percent 
35. Id.
36. Hunt & Ramón, supra note 12, at 289. 
37. ALISON CLARKE & PAUL KOHLER, PROPERTY LAW: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 35 
(2006).
38. Id.
39. Diane M. Makuc et al., Health Service Areas for the United States, in VITAL AND HEALTH 
STATISTICS (Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Ser. 2, No. 112, 1991).
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of whom were black and twelve percent of whom were Latino.40 On a state 
and statutory level, California imposed a legal obligation on counties to 
provide care for the indigent in 1937 and updated this requirement in 1965, 
the year the Watts riot occurred.41 Judicially, the Fourth Circuit struck 
down the separate-but-equal provision of the Hill-Burton Act in Simkins v. 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital in 1963;42 the Supreme Court’s denial 
of certiorari helped put an end to formally segregated health care. Subse-
quently, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 put the legislative stamp on this anti-
discrimination requirement in federally funded hospitals. Ultimately, the 
purposeful specification of KDMC’s service area, along with various legis-
lative and judicial imperatives, arguably helped establish Watts’ residence 
interest in the new hospital.
III. OPENINGS, CLOSINGS, AND TAKINGS
After identifying the property issues that are related to safety-net hos-
pitals, the next question is: what is the relationship between dignity takings 
and safety-net hospital closings? This part explores this association by 
highlighting the development of KDMC after its opening, situating its tra-
jectory against the larger post-1965 health care environment, and teasing 
out the nuances of Atuahene’s definitions of takings and dignity takings.
A. The Life of KDMC
When Martin Luther King Jr. General Hospital opened in 1972, seven 
years after the riot, it was described as “the finest and biggest [hospital] 
ever built in and for a black community.”43 Unfortunately for the hospital, 
the country looked different by the time it opened. The ideological cli-
mate—particularly in the areas of politics, law, and economics—all became 
increasingly conservative in ways that were not necessarily unique to 
KDMC, but did not create the ideal set of conditions for any new hospital 
to thrive, especially in California. Economically, two important things hap-
40. M. Alfred Haynes et al., Health Problems in the Martin Luther King, Jr., Hospital Service 
Area: Implications for a Community Medicine Program, CAL. MED., Apr. 1973, at 105, 106.
41. The statute states: “Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support all 
incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully 
resident therein, when such persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives and friends, by 
their own means, or by state hospitals or other state or private institutions.” CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
17000 (West 2017).
42. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 
938 (1964).
43. Dr. King Hospital Set to Open in Health-Care-Starved Watts, LONG BEACH INDEP., Mar. 24, 
1972, at 20. 
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pened that are both linked to the government’s scissoring of the safety-net 
in the 1970s. First, California helped foment a national taxpayer revolt in 
1978 when the state passed Proposition 13, which imposed limits on prop-
erty taxes and impacted counties’ ability to generate funds for social ser-
vices like public hospitals.44 Second, the federal government became 
concerned about increasing health care costs and began passing legislation 
that emphasized market principles and cost containment—both of which 
are arguably in tension with prioritizing health in poor communities.45 In
short, the government and conservatives began to grow critical of the Great 
Society’s expansion of the health safety-net.
In the 1980s, the primacy of market-based principles persisted and 
trickled down into South Los Angeles and other minority communities 
served by public hospitals. In the beginning of the decade, President 
Reagan saw Medicaid as a space for reduced spending.46 For example, 
between 1981 and 1984, federal expenditures for Medicaid were cut by $4 
billion.47 Tighter restrictions on eligibility, along with private hospitals’ 
concerns about poor patients’ ability to pay led hospitals to engage in “pa-
tient dumping.”48 This practice involves a hospital rejecting a patient after 
finding out that she has either no insurance or inadequate insurance. Since 
private hospitals operated under the “no duty to treat” rule, tort liability was 
limited and these private entities would transfer patients to public hospitals 
like KDMC (which often had statutory obligations to provide care to the 
poor).49 Mainstream media outlets such as the New York Times, Chicago 
Tribune, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post, among others, covered 
44. Robert Lindsey, Many States Moving to Limit Spending, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1978, at A9. 
See generally DAVID O. SEARS & JACK CITRIN, TAX REVOLT: SOMETHING FOR NOTHING IN 
CALIFORNIA (1982); CLARENCE Y. H. LO, SMALL PROPERTY VERSUS BIG GOVERNMENT: SOCIAL 
ORIGINS OF THE PROPERTY TAX REVOLT (1990); ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN ET AL., PROPERTY TAXES AND 
TAX REVOLTS: THE LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 13 (1995); Clyde Haberman, The California Ballot 
Measure That Inspired a Tax Revolt, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/17/us/the-california-ballot-measure-that-inspired-a-tax-revolt.html 
[http://perma.cc/A2MM-26JU]. 
45. See, e.g., Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e–300e-14a (2016); 
see also LAWRENCE BROWN, POLITICS AND HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION: HMO AS FEDERAL POLICY
(1983).
46. Lynn Etheredge, Reagan, Congress, and Health Spending, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 1983, at 14; 
Karen Davis, Reagan Administration Health Policy, 2 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 312 (1981); Kenneth R. 
Wing, The Impact of Reagan-Era Politics on the Federal Medicaid Program, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 1
(1983);
47. Diane Rowland et al., Medicaid: Health Care for the Poor in the Reagan Era, 9 ANN REV.
PUB. HEALTH 427, 430 (1988).
48. Mitchell F. Rice & Woodrow Jones Jr., The Uninsured and Patient Dumping: Recent Policy 
Responses in Indigent Care, 83 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 874 (1991).
49. See generally Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide 
Emergency Care, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 21 (1989).
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the patient dumping phenomenon.50 The stories were jarring: a man who 
was transferred from one emergency room to another with a steak knife 
still in his back;51 stillbirths caused by private hospitals’ shuffling of wom-
en in labor;52 a man who suffered second- and third-degree burns and was 
rejected by approximately forty hospitals because of his inability to pay.53
In response, Congress passed the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), which was arguably the most important 
federal health law passed since Medicare and Medicaid two decades earli-
er.54 EMTALA required Medicare-receiving hospitals with emergency 
services to provide stabilizing treatment to individuals who presented 
themselves at a hospital irrespective of citizenship status or ability to pay.55
Since most hospitals accept Medicare funding, the reach of the law was
wide. EMTALA essentially created a limited federal right to emergency 
care. As one commentator rightfully observes, “the hospital emergency 
department is perhaps the only local institution where professional help is 
mandated by law, with guaranteed availability for all persons, all the time, 
regardless of the problem.”56
Although EMTALA was certainly a progressive development in the 
area of health care, it posed three problems for KDMC and public hospitals 
generally. First, the law was an unfunded mandate; the federal government 
required hospitals to provide emergency care but shifted the costs to hospi-
tals and local governments.57 The law was a boon to public hospitals in that 
50. Ronald Sullivan, Care of Poor Is Cut by Private Hospitals, N.Y TIMES (May 30, 1982), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/30/nyregion/care-of-poor-is-cut-by-private-
hospitals.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/S4P3-THE]; Kenan Heise, ‘Dumping’ The Poor at 
County Hospital Angers Staff, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3, 1982 at B3; Margaret Engel, Hospitals Refusing to 
Admit Poor, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 1984),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1984/10/15/hospitals-refusing-to-admit-poor/c288388f-
6c72-4948-9615-8b8696db22df/?utm_term=.65a6b7f2c74d [http://perma.cc/T9HA-379F]; Daniel S. 
Greenberg, Health-Care Thrift Spurs Patient-Dumping, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1984, at 5. 
51. George J. Annas, Your Money or Your Life: ‘Dumping’ Uninsured Patients from Hospital 
Emergency Wards, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 74 (1986).
52. Stillbirth Traced to ‘Dumping,’ CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 19, 1985), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-12-19/news/8503280238_1_stillbirth-obstetrician-two-private-
hospitals [https://perma.cc/DJ5T-4WTX].
53. Savannah Burn Victim Dies; Hospitals Barred Admission, N.Y TIMES (May 26, 1982), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/26/us/savannah-burn-victim-dies-hospitals-barred-admission.html 
[https://perma.cc/QR9G-QN25]. 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2016).
55. Id. 
56. James A. Gordon, The Hospital Emergency Department as a Social Welfare Institution, 33 
ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 321, 324 (1999).
57. See WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 211 (2009) 
(“EMTALA’s greatest shortcoming is that it places the ultimate safety net in the emergency room but 
fails to fund the care it mandates.”).
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it prevented private hospitals from dumping patients, but it also created 
incentives for private hospitals to opt out of the emergency business.58 Pri-
vate hospitals simply pulled out of local trauma networks or closed their 
emergency rooms in Los Angeles and across the country.59 For example, 
between 1985 and 1990, more than a third of hospitals in Los Angeles 
County’s twenty-two-hospital trauma network withdrew from participa-
tion.60 This attrition impacted four of the county hospitals in L.A. (includ-
ing KDMC).61 These four hospitals provided 55.5 percent of the 
uncompensated emergency care shortly after the federal government passed 
EMTALA, whereas fifty-one hospitals split the remaining forty-five per-
cent of uncompensated costs.62 Dr. Brian Johnson, emergency director at 
the downtown-based White Memorial Hospital complained about this attri-
tion: “People will literally die in the streets and in their offices . . . you’d be 
better off having a heart attack in Mexico City than in Los Angeles.”63
Increased statutory requirements on emergency care came at a time 
where cities—Los Angeles included—encountered an unprecedented mix 
of social maladies. The emergence of crack cocaine, the increase in gun 
violence, and the spread of new and old diseases all brought more people 
through emergency room doors with a federal right to emergency care be-
hind them.64 Dr. Xylina Bean served as an Associate Professor of Pediat-
rics as well as the Director of Intermediate Care Nursery and Infant 
58. See Mark A. Hall, The Unlikely Case in Favor of Patient Dumping, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 389, 
394 (1988) (“[H]ospital concern over liability exposure through emergency room treatment has resulted 
in a disturbing outbreak of emergency room closings in some parts of the country.”).
59. Again, some of these trends precede EMTALA. See CAL. STATE AUDITOR, REPORT 2013-
116, LOS ANGELES COUNTY: LACKING A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF ITS TRAUMA SYSTEM, IT
CANNOT DEMONSTRATE THAT IT HAS USED MEASURE B FUNDS TO ADDRESS THE MOST PRESSING 
TRAUMA NEEDS 9 (2014).
60. Id.
61. Glenn A. Melnick et al., Uncompensated Emergency Care in Hospital Markets in Los Ange-
les County, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 514, 515 (1989).
62. Id.
63. Robert Reinhold, Crisis in Emergency Rooms: More Symptoms than Cures, N.Y. TIMES (July 
28, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/28/us/crisis-in-emergency-rooms-more-symptoms-than-
cures.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/C7CF-54RH].
64. Ellie E. Schoenbaum et al., HIV Antibody in Persons Screened for Syphilis: Prevalence in a
New York City Emergency Room and Primary Care Clinics, 17 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES
190 (1990); James D. Colliver & Andrea N. Kopstein, Trends in Cocaine Abuse Reflected in Emergen-
cy Room Episodes Reported to DAWN, 106 PUB. HEALTH REP. 59, 61–63 (1991); H. Range Hutson et 
al., Injuries and Deaths from Gang Violence: They Are Preventable, 21 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED.
1234 (1992); Yih-Ing Hser et al., Drug Use and Correlates Among Sexually Transmitted Disease 
Patients, Emergency Room Patients, and Arrestees, 28 J. DRUG ISSUES 437 (1998); Robert M. Brackbill 
& Maya R. Sternberg, Where Do People Go for Treatment of Sexually Transmitted Diseases?, 31 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 10, 11 (1999).
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Follow-Up Programs at KDMC.65 In 1988, she testified in front of Con-
gress about the health problems facing young mothers at the hospital, how 
drug use is related to lack of prenatal care, and the scarcity of outpatient 
drug programs in Los Angeles for women who would want to remain drug 
free.66 By 1991, she noted that KDMC saw the largest number of sub-
stance-abusing women in Los Angeles County and claimed that infants 
who did not receive prenatal care could cost KDMC anywhere from 
$30,000 to $1 million.67
Gun violence, which was also not unique to Los Angeles but certainly 
pronounced, compounded the problem. Gang-related homicide rates for 
black males between the ages of fifteen and nineteen tripled in a decade in 
Los Angeles.68 Between 1979 and 1981 the homicide rate was approxi-
mately sixty per 100,000 people.69 Between 1989 and 1991 this number 
was 192.41 per 100,000. 70 Much of this violence occurred in KDMC’s 
catchment area, which birthed the Bloods and Crips street gangs.71
Finally, the reemergence of syphilis and the proliferation of 
HIV/AIDS hampered public hospital emergency rooms. The syphilis rate 
per 100,000 increased across the country from 10.5 in 1985 to 14.7 in 
1987; in South Central Los Angeles, this rate increased from eighty two in 
1985 to an astounding 402.72 A 1994 study conducted jointly by doctors 
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Los Angeles 
County Department of Health Sciences, and King/Drew doctors empirically 
demonstrated what many suspected: the hospital served a population at 
greater risk for HIV-1 infection.73 This amalgam of problems did not bode 
well for KDMC and public hospitals as they hobbled into the 1990s; it was 
during this time period the hospital developed the undesirable nickname 
“Killer King Hospital.”74
65. Xylina Bean, Meeting the Health Care Needs of Underserved Children, 2 J. HEALTH CARE 
POOR & UNDERSERVED 147 (1991).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 155. 
68. H. Range Hutson et al., The Epidemic of Gang-Related Homicides in Los Angeles County 
from 1979 Through 1994, 274 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1031, 1034 (1995).
69. Id.
70. Id. 
71. See Alex Alonso, Out of the Void: Street Gangs in Black Los Angeles, in BLACK LOS 
ANGELES: AMERICAN DREAMS AND RACIAL REALITIES, supra note 12, at 140–67.
72. Janny Scott, Fund Cuts Cited in Outbreak of Syphilis Cases, L.A. TIMES (May 8, 1988), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1988-05-08/news/mn-3815_1_infectious-syphilis-cases 
[https://perma.cc/DEY9-SWVX].
73. Tippavan Nagachinta et al., HIV-1 Seroprevalence in an Inner-City Public Hospital, 86 J.
NAT’L MED. ASS’N 358, 359–60 (1994).
74. Hunt & Ramón, supra, note 12.
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In the last decade of the twentieth century, the continued growth of 
health care costs, concurrent prioritization of market-logics, and bubbling 
anti-welfare sentiments put public hospitals on more fragile ground. These 
institutions’ inability to deal with health-related social problems—partly 
because these issues required more than medical remedies and partly be-
cause of financial incapability—only added to many people’s reservation 
about public health largesse. In Los Angeles, a dizzying array of proposed 
lay-offs, budget cuts, reductions in services, and potential closings of hos-
pitals and clinics created an environment that was so dire that President 
Clinton personally visited Los Angeles in 1995 to announce a $364 million 
infusion into County coffers.75 During this time period, which was shortly 
after Clinton’s failed attempt at national health insurance but still in the 
throes of welfare reform, journalists and the medical community wrestled 
specifically with role of the public hospital within the country’s safety-net 
system.76
In the meantime, mainstream media coverage of medical errors and 
malfeasance at KDMC weakened public support for the institution for the 
next decade. In 1995, a woman who came in for routine hysterectomy re-
ceived HIV-positive blood and contracted the virus.77 That same year, a 
psychiatrist pled guilty to grand theft of Medi-Cal funds.78 In 1997, the
hospital faced accusations of employment discrimination against Latinos 
75. Seth Mydans, With $1 Billion Deficit, Los Angeles County Begins Facing Painful Cuts, N.Y.
TIMES (June 22, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/22/us/with-1-billion-deficit-los-angeles-
county-begins-facing-painful-cuts.html [https://perma.cc/S7JB-WQCC]; Josh Meyer & Jeffrey Rabin, 
County Official Warns of 5,000 Health Layoffs, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 30 1995), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-08-30/local/me-40345_1_county-health [https://perma.cc/2FJW-
FWJ6]; James Sterngold, Budget Slashes Could Close Hospital, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/17/us/budget-slashes-could-close-hospital.html 
[https://perma.cc/9KJP-QYK3]; Jeffrey L. Rabin, New Layoffs Approved at 3 County Hospitals, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 1996), http://articles.latimes.com/1996-09-11/news/mn-42579_1_county-health-
system [https://perma.cc/XRR8-MFWM]; B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Clinton Acts to Save Los Angeles 
Clinics, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/23/us/clinton-acts-to-save-los-
angeles-clinics.html [https://perma.cc/4EEV-MA4V]; Josh Meyer & Jeffrey Rabin, Layoffs in Health 
Dept. Postponed, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 27, 1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-09-27/news/mn-
50543_1_county-health [https://perma.cc/RW88-9NER;] John Wildermuth, L.A. Has Played Budget 
Magic Since Prop. 13, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 13, 1995), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/L-A-Has-
Played-Budget-Magic-Since-Prop-13-3022017.php [https://perma.cc/Z6QB-HRZR].
76. Wildermuth, supra note 75.
77. Josh Meyer, Blood Bank Setup Faulted In HIV-Tainted Transfusion: Health: County, Federal 
Reports Cited Serious Problems at King/Drew. Patient Was Infected Last Year., L.A. TIMES (Dec. 19, 
1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-12-19/news/mn-15647_1_blood-bank [https://perma.cc/TB5X-
D3SN].
78. Josh Meyer, Doctor on County Payroll Despite Fraud Conviction: Health: King/Drew Psy-
chiatrist Pleaded Guilty in August. He Was Placed on Leave Wednesday, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 1995), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-11-30/news/mn-8792_1_county-payroll [https://perma.cc/X9EW-
X6QL]. 
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and Asians.79 Los Angeles County also found that unapproved moonlight-
ing (i.e., having a secondary job) was a problem throughout the County’s 
hospitals, but governmental and media scrutiny fell specifically upon a 
KDMC.80 In 1998, a woman died after drinking a poisonous chemical mix-
ture that was accidently left near her nightstand.81 In 1999, the hospital was 
back in the spotlight after the California Supreme Court reduced the dam-
ages award given to a mother whose eighteen-month-old daughter died 
after KDMC failed to properly stabilize her pursuant to EMTALA.82 The
early years of the twenty-first century were rife with revocations of various 
accreditations at the institution; by 2004, the Los Angeles Times dialed up 
the scrutiny and produced a Pulitzer Prize-winning series that further high-
lighted medical errors, mismanagement, and the rocky politics surrounding 
the institution.83 By 2007, after years of federal probes and being placed on 
what amounted to institutional probation, King/Drew closed as a general 
acute care hospital and downsized into an outpatient services outfit.84
B. Hospital Closings as Dignity Takings
With this brief history laid out, the next step is to consider whether the 
closing of this hospital constitutes a taking or a dignity taking. Atuahene 
defines the broader categories of takings as a circumstance “when a person, 
entity, or state confiscates, destroys, or diminishes rights to property with-
out the informed consent of rights holders.”85 Subsequently, she describes 
dignity takings as an instance when “the state directly or indirectly destroys 
property or confiscates various property rights from owners or occupiers 
and the intentional or unintentional outcome is dehumanization or infan-
tilization.”86 There are some obvious and more subtle differences between 
79. Josh Meyer & Jeffrey L. Rabin, Health Director Confronts Racial Disparity, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 18, 1996), http://articles.latimes.com/1996-02-18/local/me-37361_1_top-health-department 
[https://perma.cc/9YSD-TSAK].
80. Josh Meyer, Moonlighting by County Doctors Found Systemwide, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 
1997), http://articles.latimes.com/1997/aug/12/news/mn-21787 [https://perma.cc/J9VZ-F7ZT].
81. Josh Meyer, Patient Killed by Poison, Tests Find, L.A. TIMES (March 5, 1998), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/mar/05/local/me-25653 [https://perma.cc/2UWH-MPTS]. 
82. Barris v. County of Los Angeles, 972 P.2d 966 (Cal. 1999); Harriet Chiang, High Court OKs 
Reduced Malpractice Sum in Girl’s Death / State’s $250,000 Limit Applies in Suit over Hospital 
‘Dumping,’ S.F. CHRON., Mar. 26, 1999, http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/High-Court-OKs-
Reduced-Malpractice-Sum-in-Girl-s-2939780.php [https://perma.cc/LEM8-635D].
83. The Troubles at King/Drew, supra note 10.
84. Jennifer Steinhauer & Regan Morris, Los Angeles Hospital to Close After Failing Tests and 
Losing Financing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/11/us/11hospital.html [http://perma.cc/V96K-55LX]. 
85. Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of 
Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171 (2016) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
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these two categories that are at the center of this subsection. First, dignity 
takings focus on the state (although not exclusively), whereas broader tak-
ings also entail persons and entities. Second, Atuahene’s contribution is 
concerned primarily with destruction and confiscation, whereas takings 
include those actions and diminution. Third, and most substantively, digni-
ty takings are pronouncedly different because they emphasize the role of 
dehumanization and infantilization that accompany state action or inaction.
1. The Role of the State and Other Private Entities
The first question that the concept of dignity takings invites is: why is 
there an exclusive focus on state action or inaction? The easy answer might 
be because of the state’s power to affect its proprietary interests. Moreover, 
Atuahene’s ground-up analysis produced the concept, which could not be 
unmoored from the South African state’s undoubtedly outsized role in its 
vicious apartheid regime. The KDMC story suggests that there may be 
room for considering the role of private entities, such as the media, when 
analyzing a dignity taking.
The Los Angeles Times was an integral player in KDMC’s closing; the 
hospital’s failures certainly did it no favors but the Times’s award-winning, 
blunt journalism brought new kinds of regulatory scrutiny to the hospital.87
African Americans’ uneasy relationship with the mass media and the Los
Angeles Times specifically, is noteworthy.88 Beginning in the 1990s, and 
continuing into the next decade, black Los Angelinos criticized the Times
for the perceived heightened attention that the paper gave the hospital.89 In
1996, the newspaper itself recognized that individuals considered its com-
mentary unduly.90 Dr. Reed V. Tuckson, who served as president of 
KDMC’s academic arm believed that “the coverage was unfair. 
Why . . . doesn’t anyone investigate the other county hospitals?”91 He add-
87. The Troubles at King/Drew, supra note 10; see also Letter from Steven Chickering, W. 
Consortium Survey & Certification Officer, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Svcs., to Antoinette Smith 
Epps, Hospital Administrator, Martin Luther King, Jr./Charles R. Drew Medical Ctr. (Sept. 22, 2006), 
http://lahealthaction.org/library/CMS_Termination_Letter_For_KDMC.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA6X-
ZNXA].
88. See generally Adeno Addis, “Hell Man, They Did Invent Us:” The Mass Media, Law, and 
African Americans, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 523 (1993); Regina Austin, Beyond Black Demons & White 
Devils: Anti-Black Conspiracy Theorizing & the Black Public Sphere, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021 
(1995); PAMELA NEWKIRK, WITHIN THE VEIL: BLACK JOURNALISTS, WHITE MEDIA (2000).
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ed, “we get hammered unmercifully.”92 In a rare letter to the editor that was 
a break from the laudation the Times received for its coverage of the hospi-
tal, one person wrote: “In your unrelenting attack on King/Drew Medical 
Center, you fail to address several issues. For example, how many lives 
have been saved, and lifetime disabilities prevented, by the existence of 
King/Drew? What of the overwhelming majority of employees who strug-
gle daily to help improve the health of their community?”93
Demonstrations and meetings orchestrated by leaders such as Jesse 
Jackson, Maxine Waters, Martin Luther King Jr.’s oldest daughter Yolanda 
King, actress Angela Bassett, and several politicians who represented 
KDMC’s catchment area show that there was extreme skepticism about the 
paper’s motives.94 For example, several hospital administrators and local 
politicians representing South Los Angeles wrote to the Times and stated:
“[T]here needs to be a fair and balanced response to an obviously biased 
series of ‘supermarket tabloid’ type articles recently published by the Los
Angeles Times . . . . We would be the first to admit that there have been 
problems at this facility by certain individuals, but we are still waiting for 
the Times to mention the excellent work done by the more than 2400 em-
ployees, who strive extremely hard every day to care for very sick and 
traumatized patients.”95
Ultimately, the media plays a powerful role in agenda-setting and 
government accountability. In a public opinion climate that has long been 
allergic to government altruism toward poor minorities, the media’s fram-
ing of a social welfare institution’s inefficacy is likely to make clarion calls 
for shuttering more audible. As one political scientist has observed:
[W]hen powerful mass media focus on a certain problem, for instance, 
politicians may consider themselves forces to institute public remedies of 
some sort, even when there are no tested or even known solutions of the 
problem at hand. The result is a tendency to throw intractable social 
problems at bureaucrats who become scapegoats when the problems are 
not solved.96
92. Id.
93. Norman Palley, Letter to the Editor, The Examination of King/Drew, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7, 
2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/dec/07/opinion/le-king7.1 [https://perma.cc/Q6MK-RWPD].
94. Charlene Muhammad, Thousands Protest: Hands off King/Drew Trauma Unit!, FINAL CALL
(Dec. 2, 2004, 8:59 PM), 
http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/National_News_2/Thousands_protest_Hands_off_King_Drew
_Trauma_Unit_1653.shtml [https://perma.cc/HA2R-77S3].
95. Eugene Hardin et al., Letter to the Editor, RE: Recent Coverage of the King-Drew Medical 
Center, L.A. TIMES, www.latimes.com/la-kingdrew-letters03-story.html [http://perma.cc/49AV-FPUG].
96. BO ROTHSTEIN, JUST INSTITUTIONS MATTER: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL LOGIC OF THE 
UNIVERSAL WELFARE STATE 74 (1998). 
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Similar observations have been made about journalists’ mediating role 
in public school closings.97 This pattern suggests that examinations of pub-
lic bureaucracy closings or dignity takings might benefit from thinking 
about how media and other third-party intermediaries help expedite such 
events. Awareness of this relationship is especially salient as privatization 
and elimination become increasingly popular strategies in the area of public 
service provision, and as new and social media gain more persuasive pow-
er.
2. State Action?: Diminishment vs. Destruction and Confiscation
The next point in Atuahene’s definition of dignity takings that is worth 
briefly highlighting is the role of state (in)action vis-à-vis the confiscation 
or destruction of property. Missing from this construction of dignity takings 
but present in Atuahene’s general definition of takings is the verb “dimin-
ish.” This inclusion raises difficult questions about funding and downsiz-
ing. First, are rights to a hospital—or other social welfare institutions that 
are ultimately shuttered— diminished when the state does not adequately 
support it? This is an analytically related but distinct question that should 
be addressed before determining whether the actual closing constitutes a 
dignity taking. Reasonable minds may disagree and come to different con-
clusions.
On one hand, being underfunded, understaffed, and under-resourced 
can lead any bureaucracy to underperform; these were constant complaints 
made by KDMC administrators over the years.98 At the same time, such 
grievances can easily erode accountability through ineptitude and ineffi-
ciency. No doubt, KDMC faced some drastic circumstances: it served some 
of the sickest, poorest, and most uninsured patients in the County and in an 
area that was notorious for gang violence. What might be adequate for the 
average safety-net hospital (if there is one) may not have sufficed for 
97. LOIS WEINER, THE FUTURE OF OUR SCHOOLS: TEACHERS UNIONS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 39
(2012) (describing how campaigns protesting school closures in Los Angeles, Chicago, and Rochester 
use social media to counter the news in the corporate media, which seldom explains the harm done in 
school closings); Alexandra Allweiss et al., Behind the Photos and the Tears: Media Images, Neoliberal 
Discourses, Racialized Constructions of Space and School Closings in Chicago, 18 RACE ETHNICITY &
EDUC. 611 (2015) (“Through a myriad of visual imagery and discourses that present students in urban 
spaces as violent, fearful, and out-of-control, neo-liberal education and media discourses facilitate a 
framework in which many people believe ‘the closing of schools is a reform strategy’ . . . . In Chicago, 
‘saving solutions’ have been framed through neoliberal school reforms that have led to the closing of 
public schools predominantly in poor communities of color throughout the city that have been labeled 
as ‘failing’.”).
98. But see Opinion, Perilous Chairs, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2004), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/dec/07/opinion/ed-kingdrew7 [https://perma.cc/B9PE-GSTV] (chal-
lenging the idea that KDMC was underfunded). 
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KDMC. But resource constraints do not explain the full picture. The com-
ments of Danny J. Bakewell Jr., publisher of the African-American-owned 
newspaper Los Angeles Sentinel, are useful here. After the highly-
publicized 2007 death of Edith Rodriquez, a woman who writhed in pain 
on KDMC’s emergency room floor while a janitor mopped around her, 
Bakewell maintained:
We can debate all you want why the conditions at the hospital are not 
right . . . . [B]asic services and human kindness are not do [sic] to budget 
cuts, they are do [sic] to a lack of compassion . . . . When a person lays 
on the ground vomiting up blood and we clean up the blood but ignore 
the person. When we watch a person agonize in pain and just ignore 
them and assume they are faking, we really do have a problem.99
Thus, an important issue that Atuahene’s distinction between takings 
and dignity takings leaves open is: how does a lack of state support for 
social welfare institutions such as hospitals relate to takings? If the state’s 
lack of funding to such institutions precipitates a closing, does the closing 
fall within the bounds of a dignity taking? A glance at Professor Atua-
hene’s description of the term might suggest so, and I think her concept is 
roomy enough to accommodate such resource deprivation. Alternatively, if 
the underfunding narrative is unconvincing, a relevant inquiry remains: 
what is the relationship between closings and takings?
There is also the issue of form that may seem persnickety on its face, 
but is actually quite substantive: where does the downsizing of a public
institution fall within the takings and dignity takings spectrum? This con-
sideration is relevant because KDMC as a whole did not close. The 
school—Charles R. Drew University of Medicine and Science—separated 
from the hospital; the latter ceased offering inpatient services and shuttered 
its trauma center—its crown jewel. The hospital effectively downsized into 
a clinic that offered outpatient services.100 This cutting of services is just 
one permutation of hospital downsizing; others include reduction of beds, 
staff outsourcing, and “rightsizing.”101 These various forms of hospital 
reorganization may eliminate access to certain kinds of services, reduce 
rates of admission, and render original core services non-existent. Down-
sizing is also a phenomenon in other sectors of the welfare state, such as 
99. Danny J. Bakewell, Jr., Editorial, King Drew Medical Center, L.A. SENTINEL (June 21, 2007), 
https://lasentinel.net/king-drew-medical-center.html [https://perma.cc/3VTC-5GRN].
100. Robert Greene, Opinion, A Fresh Start for South L.A. Healthcare, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 18, 
2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/18/opinion/la-oe-greene18-2009dec18 
[https://perma.cc/NJ67-VQFR].
101. Yalda Mousazadeh et al., Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Methods of Hospitals’
Downsizing: A Narrative Systematic Review, 3 HEALTH PROMOTION PERSP. 276, 277 (2013).
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public education and public housing.102 These kinds of modifications can 
be animated by sincere concerns about cost and efficiency, but they also 
raise the specter of indifference that has been a theme in American medical 
history and is relevant to Atuahene’s conceptualization of dehumanization.
3. The Texture of Dehumanization and Infantilization
Accordingly, there are the remaining categories of dehumanization 
and infantilization, which are the consequences of a dignity taking. Atua-
hene defines dehumanization as the “failure to recognize an individual’s or 
group’s humanity.”103 A few points become vital here, particularly the role 
of funding. Does the state’s inadequate provision of resources for one 
community, particularly health services, constitute such dehumanization? 
Post-structuralist understandings of the state’s power over human life and 
death might offer an affirmative response.104 Sincere preferences for small 
government could offer a different answer, though. This then raises ques-
tions about whether dehumanization is something that can be descriptively 
and exclusively offered only by the individuals who suffer the dignity tak-
ing? One example might be a community of people in catchment area who 
feel perceived indifference to their lives because of inadequate governmen-
tal support to their local safety-net hospital. Alternatively, is dehumaniza-
tion something that is analytically teased out by scholars (e.g., comparisons 
of funding for different kinds of hospitals or examinations of governmental 
rationales for disparate funding of hospitals)?
Beyond questions about state funding, there is also an inquiry about 
the role of the bureaucrat in dehumanization and the devaluation of life. In 
the case of KDMC, there was an alleged indifference to some patients’ 
lives by the staff that predated the actual dignity taking. This indifference 
manifested itself in medical errors and unnecessary fatalities. An analog in 
102. Lisa Snell David & David Tokofsky, Opinion, Downsizing LAUSD, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 
2008), www.latimes.com/la-op-dustup15feb15-story.html; Edward G. Goetz, Where Have All the 
Towers Gone? The Dismantling of Public Housing in U.S. Cities, 33 J. URBAN AFF. 267 (2011); JOHN 
ARENA, DRIVEN FROM NEW ORLEANS: HOW NONPROFITS BETRAY PUBLIC HOUSING AND PROMOTE 
PRIVATIZATION (2012); Maria Hantzopoulos & Alia R. Tyner-Mullings, Introduction to CRITICAL 
SMALL SCHOOLS: BEYOND PRIVATIZATION IN NEW YORK CITY URBAN EDUCATIONAL REFORM, at xxix 
(Maria Hantzopoulos & Alia R. Tyner-Mullings eds., 2012); Jaime A. Lee, Rights at Risk in Privatized 
Public Housing, 50 TULSA L. REV. 759, 760 (2014); Mireya Navarro, New York City Housing Dept. 
Eases Rule Forcing Low-Income Tenants to Downsize, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2014 
www.nytimes.com/2014/12/05/nyregion/new-york-city-housing-dept-eases-rule-forcing-low-income-
tenants-to-downsize.html [http://perma.cc/K4AR-CBU6].
103. ATUAHENE, supra note 1, at 31. 
104. See Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15 PUB. CULTURE 11, 12 (2003) (arguing that “the 
ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate 
who may live and who must die”).
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another social welfare institution might be the negligent manager of public 
housing who lets buildings fall into disrepair. Such indolence might be the 
byproduct of resource constraints, occupational burnout, or actual disinter-
est. For Atuahene, intent may be irrelevant because she describes dignity 
takings as something than can be intentional or unintentional.105 Again, this 
is one of the strengths of the definition; it is capacious enough to examine 
different kinds of bureaucratic neglect that might predate or lead to a digni-
ty taking. The task for the scholar using this framework to analyze the clos-
ing of social welfare institutions is to delineate clearly and connect the 
kinds of dehumanization that might be part of the process of a dignity tak-
ing.
Infantilization, which she describes as the “restriction of an individu-
al’s or group’s autonomy based on the failure to recognize and respect their 
full capacity to reason,”106 is less applicable as it relates to the individuals 
within KDMC’s catchment area. A more persuasive argument could be 
made about the infantilization of the KDMC’s minority administrators, 
whom the media, the public, and local government understood as incapable 
leaders.107 Such suspicion about these minority bureaucrats’ capability 
maps on to racialized criticisms about public administration generally, but 
without knowing whether these administrators lived in KDMC’s catchment 
area (which was a controversy for the leading public official representing 
the area),108 it is difficult to tether such infantilization to the loss of the 
hospital. Moving forward, one could ask how social welfare bureaucrats, 
who are the same in-group as individuals who have suffered the dignity 
harm (because of race or residence), are associated with infantilization. 
Minorities’ representation in public administration, the identity anxieties 
that they face in such work, and increased challenges to the size of the wel-
fare state make such an inquiry timely.109
105. Atuahene, supra note 85.
106. ATUAHENE, supra note 1, at 32. 
107. See generally Mandalit del Barco, Los Angeles Waits to Learn Fate of King Drew Hospital,
NPR, (Aug, 16, 2006 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5649811 
[https://perma.cc/VRM4-SXQE].
108. Jack Leonard & Matt Lait, Supervisor’s Residence Outside District Raises Legal Questions,
L.A. TIMES (July 27, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul/27/local/me-burke27 
[https://perma.cc/45HV-WSTF].
109. See generally CELESTE WATKINS-HAYES, THE NEW WELFARE BUREAUCRATS:
ENTANGLEMENTS OF RACE, CLASS, AND POLICY REFORM (2009);
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IV. MLK COMMUNITY HOSPITAL AND DIGNITY RESTORATION
Professor Atuahene argues that when there has been a dignity taking, 
the remedy must move from mere reparations (compensation for material 
things confiscated) to dignity restoration, which is a remedy that seeks to 
provide dispossessed individuals and communities with material compensa-
tion through processes that affirm their humanity and reinforce their agen-
cy.110 Again, my concern is not about the fit of this concept in the context 
of KDMC; instead, I’m more interested in what this concept can offer pub-
lic hospital closings and vice versa.
In 2015, eight years after the government shuttered large swaths of 
KDMC’s operations, it reopened as Martin Luther King, Jr. Community 
Hospital (“MLKCH”).111 The reopening itself was a feat because many 
hospitals end up permanently closed. But KDMC’s symbolism, the demon-
strated gap in services that its downsizing created, and the work of commit-
ted politicians helped resurrect the new institution.112 Community members 
were certainly involved in the process but the substantive nature of that 
process is unclear. As the hospital’s website notes:
Mark Ridley-Thomas [the County Supervisor for the district where 
MLKCH is located] held a series of community meetings in South Los 
Angeles in 2011 to discuss the master plan for the area, which includes 
the new hospital. Hundreds of residents, civic leaders, business owners 
and health care advocates attended the meetings, asked questions and 
provided input about the planned developments. The hospital will con-
tinue to conduct periodic community health needs assessments to carry 
on this process.113
Ridley-Thomas’ office and the County publicized an English and 
Spanish advertisement that informed the public: “We need your ideas and 
insights regarding the future of the MLK, Jr. Medical Campus Master Plan, 
its relationship to the surrounding neighborhood, and how it can play a role 
in your community’s overall health and wellness.”114
110. Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating A New Theoretical 
Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 796 (2016)
111. Karlamangla, supra note 11.
112. About Us, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. CMTY. HOSP.,
http://www.mlkcommunityhospital.org/About-Us/Our-Story.aspx [https://perma.cc/79PW-6FCM].
113. Id. 
114. Mark Ridley-Thomas, Supervisor Mark Ridley-Thomas Invites You to Help Discuss the 
Future of the MLK Jr. Medical Campus, LA HEALTH ACTION,
http://www.lahealthaction.org/library/MLK_mtg01_flyer%5B1%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GVR-
LNRS].
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Notably, the new institution is smaller and does not have a trauma 
center. MLKCH is clear about both, and it states: “A trauma center pro-
vides medical services to patients who have injuries resulting from massive 
blunt trauma such as an automobile accident, gunshot wound or train or 
airplane crash. MLKCH does not have a trauma center.”115 Instead, it notes 
that its emergency room “treats serious, life-threatening conditions that do 
not result from traumatic injuries”116 such as stroke, loss of consciousness, 
chest pain, or heart attack. This was and still is a point of contention for 
community members in South Los Angeles who believed that such a center 
was absolutely necessary in that area.117 Accordingly, this invites an in-
quiry that may be unique to the closings and re-openings of public hospitals 
and other social welfare institutions. Assuming that there is community 
input that recognizes residents’ humanity but it is not fully implemented for 
legitimate reasons (e.g., costs constraints) is dignity restoration thwarted? 
Is the reopening of the institution enough?
There is also a demographic point worthy of discussion. Private prop-
erty that is tethered to a person or family is different than something like a 
public hospital. Considering the vast demographic changes in cities, where 
African Americans are slowly out-migrating,118 how can their dignity be 
restored after the closing and reopening of a public hospital if they have 
moved or been pushed out? Or, is it simply a matter of providing newcom-
ers with the same kind of property rights as former residents? This point is 
especially relevant in South Los Angeles, which is still relatively impover-
ished, but now consists primarily of Latinos.119
Finally, there is an issue of form that coincides with the earlier sec-
tion’s discussion on diminishment. MLKCH transformed from a county-
owned safety-net hospital to a private hospital governed by a non-profit 
(Martin Luther King, Jr. Los Angeles Healthcare Corporation). The privati-
zation of hospitals, public schools, and public housing are facts of life and 
occur via traditional understandings (e.g., public to for-profit) as well 
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through subtler changes (e.g., public to non-profit). Tax-exemptions and 
various additions to the Affordable Care Act make non-profit hospitals 
accountable to the public, but non-profit hospitals are qualitatively different 
from safety-net hospitals in ways that could impact poor people’s health. 
An analysis of dignity restorations in the context of privatized public ser-
vices would benefit from examining this increasing shift from public to 
private and its implications on marginalized groups’ understanding of the 
state’s responsibilities to the public.
Ultimately, the rapidly changing composition of cities, along with the 
natural ebb and flow of the health care safety-net make the phenomena of 
public hospital closings an important policy concern for people in poverty 
and racial minorities. The same applies to parts of the welfare state that 
have been transforming in the last few decades. Professor Atuahene’s con-
ceptual model offers new ways of thinking about these problems; at the 
same time, these phenomena complement her model in ways that might 
make it portable for other points in time, institutions, and communities.
